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I. INTRODUCTION
The transfer of technology to Latin America has taken place
through both the licensing process and direct investments by for-
eign enterprises that are often transnational corporations. Na-
tional law has concerned itself first with the creation of rights in
technological knowledge and the protection of these rights by law.
The regulation of these rights as set out in contractual relation-
ships and the regulation of direct investment, particularly the
technological component thereof, were dealt with thereafter.
Other matters such as the repatriation of profits (exchange con-
trol), customs controls, and various taxes have also become a part
of the national regulatory scene today.
Technological knowledge has traditionally been protected in
Latin America. Because of the dearth of locally created technol-
ogy, protection has, in fact, been largely extended to foreign
owned or controlled industrial property and other technological
knowledge. Therefore, it is the international transfer of technol-
ogy rather than local technology transfer that has been crucial to
the development of Latin American industry. Moreover, while
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protection of industrial property and other technology rights has
had a long history in Latin America, the express regulation of the
transfer of technology is a recent phenomenon. National regula-
tion was born of the realization that technology is a key to indus-
trialization and raising the standard of living. Over the past ten
years the countries of Latin America have addressed themselves
to the issues raised by the transfer of technology, and regulation
has taken the place of what could be termed a thoroughly laissez-
faire economic philosophy regarding the sale of the use of
technology.
This paper focuses on the contractual acquisition of foreign
technology through licenses and other contractual arrangements
as contrasted with the technological components in the usual di-
rect investment. Such investment is made either in the form of
the wholly-owned subsidiary of the transnational corporation or
as part of a joint venture. The use of technology as a major com-
ponent of direct investment has been discouraged over the years,
although this trend was reversed in Chile after 1977.
Modern legislation and practice in the regulation of technology
transfer is characterized in the several Latin American countries
possessing such a regime by administrative scrutiny and approval
of the contractual relationship at its inception rather than the ju-
dicial determination of alleged violations of regulatory rules dur-
ing the life of the contract.1 The approach taken follows from the
decision made by the Latin American states that they have an
indispensable role to play in assuring that the direct and indirect
costs of the importation of the technology be in the interest of
national economic and social development, irrespective of the pri-
vate benefit to the technology acquirer. This is in many ways
analogous to the role of the state in serving the public interest by
protecting the consumer.
The state's involvement in the technology transfer process has
made it an active and sometimes dominant participant in the ne-
gotiation of the contract, the evaluation of the technology and the
agreement transferring it, the approval of the agreement, and the
monitoring of its performance. Over a period of decades such reg-
ulation has evolved from rules primarily related to the payment
of royalties and to rules and regulations addressed to the entire
process of the transfer of technology. Brazil and Colombia were
1. The countries employing such a regulatory system are principally Mexico,
Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina.
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among the first of the eight or nine Latin American countries
with currently operational regimes to evolve from the pre-regula-
tory system to a modern system.
Regulation of technology transfer has been mainly national in
character. At present, however, the Andean Pact has evolved a
common set of rules,2 implemented on the national level, through
which a harmonization of the laws of the member states has been
brought about. In addition to the five states currently members of
the Andean Pact,8 Mexico,4 Brazil,5 and Argentina8 are presently
implementing systems of technology transfer regulation.
II. OVERVMEW OF INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS
While all the rules relating to the technology transfer's regula-
tion have a legislative basis in the various Latin American coun-
tries, a number of these countries delegate the authority to create
specific rules and procedures to the institutional agency or agen-
cies that are given the task of overseeing the evaluation and regis-
tration process. In Brazil the National Institute of Industrial
Property (INPI) has established rules for the transfer of technol-
ogy process and has also acted as the administrative body for car-
rying out the law.7 In Mexico the task of scrutinizing both the
transfer of technology and direct investments has been placed
within the Ministry of Patrimony and Industrial Development.
Previously transfer of technology had been dealt with administfr-
tively by a separate unit in the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce. While in some countries the entire process from assistance
2. Decision No. 24, Dec. 31, 1970, as amended by Decisions Nos. 37, June 24,
1971; 37-A, July 17, 1971; 70, Feb. 13, 1973; 103, Oct. 30, 1976; and 109, Nov. 30,
1976; of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Andean Foreign Invest-
ment Code, text at 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 138 (1977).
3. See e.g. Colombia Decree No. 1234 of 1972; Venezuela Decrees Nos. 746,
Feb. 11, 1975, and 2442, Nov. 8, 1977; Peru Decree Law 189000 July 1, 1971,
Decree Law 21, 826, Apr. 12, 1977.
4. Bill Concerning Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use
and Working of Patents, Trade-names, and Trade-marks, OF. GAz., Dec. 28,
1972, Doc. TD/B/AC.11/13, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 421 (1973).
5. Normative Act 15, establishing basic principles and norms for the registra-
tion of contracts involving the transfer of technology and related agreements,
Sept. 1975.
6. Law on Transfer of Technology, Law No. 21,617, Aug. 12, 1977, OF. GAZ.
Aug. 16, 1977.
7. See note 5 supra.
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in negotiation to post-registration monitoring is dealt with by one
agency, 8 in other countries there are several agencies that deal
with the various stages in the process of the technology transfer
regulation.9 These agencies may well include the central bank,
which is concerned with the issue of pricing and repatriation of
profits and, in some countries, registers the technology transfer
agreements.10 In some countries the national agencies whose pri-
mary task is to plan for economic and industrial development are
brought into the technology transfer regulation process."
The competent agency or agencies will conduct their scrutiny of
the technology transfer on at least three levels." The economic
elements and consequences will be analyzed in order to determine
the effect of the suggested transaction on the acquiring party and
on the economy of the acquiring country. The general effect on
balance of payments and the extent to which national industrial,
natural, and human resources will be used are the basic factors
utilized to determine the impact of the technology sought to be
transferred. This economic analysis focuses specifically on the
costs to both the acquiring party and the acquiring country, in-
cluding royalty or other direct price to be charged and the more
indirect costs involved in the control over the transaction exer-
cised by the supplier of the technology. A second type of scrutiny
involves an examination of the technology itself in order to deter-
mine whether it is current, whether it is unique and therefore not
available in the country, whether the product or process can be
used within the country without the help of the particular foreign
owned or controlled technology, and whether it is technology
which is sound in technical terms. In Latin America this investi-
gation has generally been conducted by a very limited number of
persons. In some of these countries the personnel have been
swamped by the number of requests made. This small group of
technical personnel is often confronted both with gaps in infor-
mation and with lack of precision in their legislative and adminis-
trative mandates.
8. E.g., Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia.
9. E.g., Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil.
10. E.g., Brazil and Ecuador.
11. E.g., Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico.
12. See Correa, Regimenes de Control de la Transferencia de tecnologia en
America Latina, INTAL Serie Monografias No. 5 (1979). See also Camp &
Mann, Regulating the Transfer of Technology: The Mexican Experience, 10
COL. J. WORLD Bus. 110 (1975).
[Vol. 14.269
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The administrative agency's legal role is to analyze the contrac-
tual arrangements to determine whether they are in conformity
with national law and the administrative regulations and prac-
tices that have been developed. The agency's legal staff looks at
the necessary contractual elements to determine whether they are
present. It also examines the provisions of the contract in relation
to the fundamental announced policies of the government to de-
termine whether they are consistent. This will include an inquiry
into the restrictive nature of certain contract terms and, in cer-
tain instances, the existence within the contract of certain guar-
antees required by national law. Review of the consequences of
non-performance of the technology transfer agreement, including
questions of the applicable law and disputes settlement, will also
be part of the administrative agency's responsibility to make cer-
tain that they conform to national law.
The activity of the various teams of experts to whom the pro-
posed agreements are submitted is based in each case on the in-
formation gleaned from the contract itself, from further informa-
tion given by the parties to the administrative agency in charge,
and from information provided by other concerned government
departments. The entire professional staff available to engage in
these complex and difficult tasks varies from six to thirty-two, in-
cluding economists, engineers, lawyers, and policy experts.
The process of regulation then moves from the evaluation stage
to the stage of government-party negotiations. At this stage the
parties themselves have agreed to the conditions for the transfer
of technology, and it now remains for them to adapt the contrac-
tual relationship to the requirements set forth by the goverment
authorities. In playing its role in this phase of putting the agree-
ment in final and acceptable form, the national regulatory agency
can show considerable flexibility since the law and the regulations
normally give a substantial amount of discretion to the agency.
The extent of flexibility shown by the governmental power in ap-
proving or rejecting provisions of technology transfer agreements
will depend on the general economic policies that are being fol-
lowed nationally at a particular time.
Once the final negotiations have taken place and the agreement
is deemed to be satisfactory to the government, it will be regis-
tered and considered valid under the legal system of the technol-
ogy acquiring country. The agreement will be enforceable in the
courts of the technology acquiring country, and the parties will be
able to benefit from any incentives or facilities available to valid
Spring 1981.1
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transfer of technology agreements.
The national laws define the transfer to technology transactions
that are to be governed by the regulatory regime through the list-
ing of examples. Normally, the transactions covered by the regu-
latory regime are the licensing of agreements for industrial prop-
erty rights, the sales of the use of know-how, including trade
secrets, the supply of technical assistance, and, in some countries,
the provision of technical services.13 Certain sectors of the econ-
omy are not within this regime of regulation but are covered by a
set of special rules.14 In some countries, based on practice, the
general regulatory regime will not cover contracts by public
enterprises. 15
Another aspect of the regulatory regime's scope of application
is coverage with respect to the parties to the transfer of technol-
ogy. Under the law and practice of some countries, all transfer of
technology agreements must be submitted to the regulatory sys-
tem.' This includes purely domestic agreements and those of an
international nature. In other countries the national system regu-
lates only transfer of technology agreements made between local
acquiring parties and foreign enterprises. Thus, it becomes impor-
tant in these national systems to determine when an enterprise is
considered to be foreign. This issue is particularly acute with re-
spect to cases of transfers between foreign controlled affiliates
and locally owned and controlled companies. A related problem
arises in the context of the parent-affiliate enterprise situation.
The transfer of technology from parent companies located in
industrialized countries to subsidiaries in Latin American coun-
tries is substantial. While some technology is transferred without
the formality of an agreement, more often than not there will be
an agreement between these legally separate entities for purposes
of characterizing payments as royalties in order to avoid their be-
ing termed profits for purposes of exchange control and taxa-
13. For discussion of the transfer of know-how to Brazil, and the importance
of its transfer in that country, see Rowland, Foreign Investment in Brazil: A
Reconciliation of Perspectives, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 39 (1979).
14. E.g., in Argentina and Colombia transfer of technology in the mining and
petroleum sectors are regulated separately; in Brazil the automobile and hotel
sectors are covered separately; and in Venezuela the tourism, banking and petro-
leum sectors are specially regulated.
15. E.g., Ecuador and Colombia.
16. E.g., Mexico and Brazil.
[Vol. 14.269
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tion.'7 Latin American legislation and practice have often taken
into account the fact that intra-enterprise transfers in the context
of the transnational corporation have accounted for the bulk of
technology transfer. Brazilian law prohibits royalty payments be-
tween parent and subsidiary corporations for patent and trade-
mark licensing.1 8 This approach has also been adopted by the
countries in the Andean group through Decision 24. Thus, on the
one hand, favorable treatment of royalties encourages parent-af-
filiate relations on a contractual level. While on the other hand,
legislation and practice will regulate the transaction when parents
and subsidiaries enter into the easily detectable transfer of tech-
nology agreement. There is still a wide margin left open for par-
ents and affiliates to enter into agreements regarding technical as-
sistance, the sale of the use of know-how and trade secrets, and
other licensing arrangements that do not necessarily involve pat-
ents or trademarks directly. With respect to these forms of tech-
nology transfer and agreements for technical services, national
law has been interpreted to consider remittances to be royalties
rather than profits.19 Intra-enterprise relationships remain com-
plex, and when the law closes certain loopholes, others are likely
to appear in the relationship between parent and affiliate.
III. THE TERMS OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS AND
NATIONAL REGULATION
The most basic features of technology transfer agreemelits that
national law seeks to regulate are the direct price for technology,
the duration of the agreement, and the indirect costs as brought
about by restrictive practices embodied in contract clauses. Other
features in contracts for the transfer of technology, such as
clauses on applicable law, the forum for the settlement of dis-
putes, and currency and fiscal clauses, are often placed within the
general rubric of restrictive practices.
Obviously, not all transfer of technology agreements contain
abusive terms. In fact, a large proportion of the agreements sub-
mitted will not violate national law and will be registered. A sig-
nificant minority of agreements will, however, be revised before
17. See REPORT OF OECD COMMIT= ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING
AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 45 (1979).
18. See Nattier, Brazil, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LAWS AND PRACTICE IN
LATIN AMERICA 145, 158 (B. Carl ed. 1978).
19. See REPORT OF OECD Coimmrrr ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 17.
Spring 1981]
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being registered, while others will be rejected altogether.
The determination of what is an acceptable royalty level is one
of the most difficult tasks facing the national authorities. Most
national agencies have put together certain internal policies on
the range of royalty rates acceptable. These are usually based on
the kind of technology that is being transferred and the acquiring
party's type of activity. Argentine law specifically sets forth the
maximum royalty rates for the different types of technology to be
transferred. In Brazil and Argentina the top rate is five percent
while a one percent royalty is the normal level for the use of
trademarks. Each country has set policies based on what are con-
sidered to be the most relevant distinctions. In Colombia a five
percent maximum for the internal market is permissible while
seven percent royalties are acceptable for exports. Generally, roy-
alty rates are applied on the net sales value.
The importance of Latin America as a market for technology
from industrialized countries should not be underestimated. In
1978 direct payments from Latin America accounted for approxi-
mately forty-three percent of receipts to United States companies
from developing countries for technology. A major proportion of
this amount was in royalty payments from affiliates. The more
industrialized countries such as Brazil and Argentina accounted
for a substantial percentage of the flow of technology, leaving lit-
tle to the less industrialized countries of the region. Nevertheless,
the royalty payments to the United States from its trading part-
ners in Western Europe and Japan accounted for an overwhelm-
ing portion of the payments. Latin America, like the rest of the
developing countries, accounted for a small segment of the pay-
ment flow to the United States.2 0
Like pricing, the length of the transfer of technology agreement
is a fundamental element to be evaluated by the national regula-
tory agencies. In general, the length of transfer of technology
agreements made since the regulatory systems were put into place
has diminished. The period of validity of agreement was short-
ened so that there would be an opportunity for the regulatory
agency to review the agreement after a reasonable number of
years. An agreement of indefinite length or for a very long period
may well outlast its value to the acquiring country and become a
20. For discussion and statistics on the volume of technology transfer and its
distribution, see UNCTAD Secretariat Report, The Implementaton of Transfer
of Technology Regulations, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C (1980).
[VoL. 14:269
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substantial economic burden, tempting the national authorities to
terminate the agreement despite the announced duration. This
type of action would be denounced as a violation of contract
rights by the supplying party and by its home country and might
precipitate a negative turn in economic and political relations be-
tween the countries involved.
A further basic element of technology transfer regulation con-
cerns the indirect costs of the transfer that are embodied in the
contract as a series of restrictive clauses. These clauses are nor-
mally imposed on the acquirer of technology, restricting its enjoy-
ment of the technology rights acquired. The restrictions are per-
ceived by the developing nations not only to affect the acquirer of
a technology, but also to have an important impact on the acquir-
ing party's country, particularly its economic development. As
with the other costs of the transfer of technology, the acquiring
country is deemed to have an interest in diminishing the indirect
costs. Among the contract provisions most frequently found to
impose restrictions are export constraints, tying clauses, restric-
tions on the amount and type of production permissible, grant-
back clauses, clauses restricting the use of the technology after
the expiration of the agreement, and clauses which impose the
use of unnecessary industrial property rights upon the acquiring
party. The inquiry into the validity of clauses sanctioning restric-
tive practices is not confined to contracts between independent
entities. Parent-affiliate contractual arrangements are also subject
to scrutiny for restrictive practices. In the latter cases, the agree-
ment may not formally contain restrictive practices, although it
can be assumed that the affiliate will conform to the policies of
the parent company.
In certain national legislation the list of prohibited practices is
exhaustive, while in others the listing is set forth by way of exam-
ple. The proscription of practices which are identified in the na-
tional law, or in the regional legislation, as being restrictive is not
absolute. Decision 24 of the Andean Pact and some national legis-
lation appear to make the prohibition of certain practices abso-
lute. Where the legislation does not, however, provide for exemp-
tions from these per se rules, the administering authorities
usually have the authority to act in a flexible manner. Sometimes
the legislation itself provides for such flexibility. In Mexico the
law provides that certain practices that are proscribed will be
considered to be valid if the technology transferred is of special
interest to the country.
Spring 1981]
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Concern over the use of choice of law and choice of forum
clauses to vitiate the effect of national legislation and general pol-
icies has led to the inclusion of provisions prohibiting the use of
exclusive choice of law and choice of forum clauses. It is, there-
fore, expected that the national law of the acquiring country will
be applied by the national courts of that country in all matters
concerning the validity and performance of the transfer of tech-
nology agreement.
IV. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Latin American regulatory systems for the transfer of tech-
nology have generally adopted what may be called a preventive
system for the control of abuses in the transfer of technology. It is
no wonder that the single biggest reason for the rejection of trans-
fer of technology agreement clauses is the existence of provisions
in contracts reflecting unacceptable restrictive practices. It ap-
pears that the purpose of regulation in Latin America is not to
impede the flow of technology, but to prevent the imposition of
contract terms which are inimical to the economic development of
the country of the acquiring party. Accordingly, there is a higher
instance of initial rejection of contracts because of the invalidity
of one or more clauses than final rejection once the offending
clauses have been modified. Of course, if the parties were to con-
tinue to consider as valid a clause which has either been declared
invalid or would be declared invalid if the authorities knew of it,
such a clause would be severable from the rest of the agreement.
This would be necessary in order to safeguard the interest of the
acquiring state in the validity of agreements transferring technol-
ogy to the country and its national enterprises.
There appears to be no distinct pattern in the volume of trans-
fer of technology in the years since the creation of the various
regulatory regimes. As the industrial base of a Latin American
country becomes more powerful and extensive, the country may
become more selective in the technology permitted to be trans-
ferred. Thus, for example, it is perceived that Brazil has become
more severe in the application of its national policies. Significant
changes in the economic orientation of a national regime may
cause the system of regulation to be changed drastically. This has
certainly been true of the regime in Chile and, to some extent,
Argentina.
Latin American countries have shown great interest from the
very beginning in the internationalization of the concept of a reg-
[Vol. 14.269
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ulatory regime for the transfer of technology. This is undoubtedly
why Latin America has been a strong supporter of the work on
the international code of conduct on the transfer of technology.2 1
The code of conduct would create a model regulatory regime, al-
beit of a modest nature, which could be used by states in fashion-
ing their own national regimes. Since such systems are already in
place in many Latin American countries, the urgency of the adop-
tion of the code is probably less pressing than it is for other re-
gions. Nevertheless, its adoption would reinforce the international
acceptability of the existing national and sub-regional systems.
Like the national legislation and institutions to be found in the
Latin American countries, the code of conduct as an international
model would appear to be aimed at eliminating abuses in the sys-
tem of the protection of technological knowledge, while maintain-
ing the flow of technology through contractual arrangements.
21. The most recent version is Draft International Code of Conduct on the
Transfer of Technology as of 6 May 1980, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/25 (1980).
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